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was part of an attempt to reshape the relationship
of the Indian state to economic interests. The
budget reasserts the autonomy of. . . 'high politics'.
It proposes not only to free business from the state
(within limits) but to free the state from
businesses. The budget is an attempt to move the
state away from patronage politics and toward
playing a developmental role, in opposition to the
tendencies of the last two decades . . . The new
developmental role is, however, an openly elitist
one [Rubin 1985:942].
These views, postulating the emergence of a new
economic regime, have been falsified by subsequent
developments in economic policy and of trends in the
economy. In presenting his next budget in 1986 the
Finance Minister, V. P. Singh, claimed that his
priorities were 'to strengthen the public sector', 'to
provide a further thrust to anti-poverty programmes'
and 'to provide relief to the common man'. The
Budget proposed to increase Plan outlays by 20.5 per
cent and to increase expenditure for anti-poverty
programmes by 65 per cent, though critics pointed out
that even after this increase these programmes would
represent less than three per cent of all Plan outlays
[Kurien 1986]. And even though, as the Far Eastern
Economic Review reported 'In the main. . . the 1986-87
budget carried on the tax rationalising initiative begun
in the previous year . . . (it also) . . . introduced a
modified value-added tax scheme, designed to provide
a finer-tuned instrument of fiscal control over
industrial development' [July31, 19861. The Economist
regretted what it saw as evidence of a failure to carry
liberalïsatïon forward, which it thought was due to the
government's having given in to political pressures
(March 8, 1986). It was claimed in 1985 that the most
important part of the purpose of the tax concessions
that were introduced was to improve receipts by better
compliance, and it is true that there was an increase in
receipts from personal income tax of 24.3 per cent in
1985-86 (though the rate fell in the following year, so
that it once again lagged behind the growth of money
incomes of those liable to income tax [EPW March 7,
1987:387]). In spite of increased receipts from direct
taxation in 1985-86, the imbalance between direct and
indirect taxation deteriorated further in the 1986
budget, and the estimated deficit increased yet again.
A critic wrote:
The government appears to be unable to generate
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Developments in India's Economic Policy
The first budget of Rajiv Gandhi's premiership in 1985
was hailed by some as marking the inception of a new
economic regime. It reduced income, corporate and
wealth taxes, cut import duties on capital goods,
provided tax breaks to exporters and largely
eliminated licensing restrictions on investments in 25
main industries (including machine tools, industrial
machinery, electrical equipment and electronic
components). The philosophy of the budget was to
help the private sector, and growth in public sector
expenditure was to be kept to the lowest level for many
years. Allocations for rural employment and related
anti-poverty programmes were to be relatively
reduced. Nonetheless a record budget deficit was
forecast, though it was asserted that this would not be
inflationary in view of the favourable positions both of
foodstocks and of foreign exchange reserves.
Supporters and critics alike saw in these measures a
radically new approach in economic policy, which
seemed to extend the general tendency of economic
'liberalisation' to India - though the policy changes
proposed were in fact foreshadowed in India's
negotiations with the ¡MF for Special Drawing Rights
in 1981. TheEconomist, naturally sympathetic to what
it saw as a move towards the freeing of markets, said
that 'Mr Rajiv Gandhi's first budget tackles the red
tapes and draconian taxes introduced by his mother
and his grandfather which have hindered growth in the
Indian economy.. . The liberalisat ion is not complete
But (the changes) take India a big step away from
the days when bureaucrats rather than businessmen
decided its investment plans' [March 23, 1985]. The
critical Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) has
argued 'For the first time since Independence we have
in New Delhi an administration which has an
unabashed allegiance to a specific ideology. . . (which
has) . . . three strands: development is best left to
private initiative, taxes are evil and the poor are
dispensable' [March 7, 1987]. A political scientist,
Barnett Rubin, saw even more in the changes in policy
announced:
Analysts and critics rightly saw the new budget as
an attempt to accelerate growth by freeing the
upper sectors of society to consume and invest.
What most of them missed, however, was that it
The State in Retreat? Why has India Experienced Such
Half-hearted 'Liberalisation' in the 1980s?
resources from its own enterprises. It is unwilling
or afraid to tax those who are rich and growing
richer. It feels compelled to increase outlays on
so-called welfare measures. Then it is left with no
option but to fall back on indirect taxes and to rely
more than ever on borrowings from those who
expect interest and tax concessions for temporarily
parting with their resources, to enable the
government to continue with its so-called
'development programmes' [Kurien 1986:630].
Thus supporters of economic liberalisation were
disturbed by what they saw as some back-sliding in the
1986 Budget, while critics of government policy saw a
deepening of the fiscal problems inherent in the 1985
policies.
By 1987 the champion of economic liberalisation has
moved to a position of scepticism about the extent to
which there really has been change in the economic
regime in India. The Economist has recognised that
'Rajiv Gandhi's liberalisation of the economy has
been an inconsistent affair' [January 31, 1987],
expressed sympathy for the view that '. . . a better
description of what the government is doing would be
half-hearted, ill-thought out tinkering' and conceded
that'.. . there are not yet any telling measures of how
much today's respectable 6 per cent industrial growth
is due to liberalisation' [May 7, 1987]. The removal of
V. P. Singh from the Finance Ministry early in the year
and not long before the presentation of the budget was
widely seen as the result of the government's having
given in to pressures from big business and
professional people, threatened by Singh's pursuit of
tax evaders [see Far Eastern Economic Review July 31,
1986 for a comment anticipating Singh's removal for
these reasons]; and it is felt that powerful lobbies are
able to reverse the economic reforms of 1985 when it
suits them. In other words, the doubts that Ruhm
expressed about' . . . whether the political leadership is
indeed willing and able to reassert the autonomy of
'high politics' from the variegated elements of the
dominant coalition in order to impose on them the
costs of change' [1985:956] seem to have been amply
justified - and the answer to the question he implies is
quite simply 'No'.
Economic Trends
Strong claims are still being made about the buoyancy
and confidence of the economic climate in India. The
government's Economic Survey ¡986-87 opens with the
claim that the Indian economy'. . . is now on a new
growth path', pointing out that the average annual
rate of growth in the 1980s has been five per cent,
'much higher' than the historical trend rate of growth.
Estimates of the rate of growth in the 1980s are
influenced, however, by the fact that the base year,
1979-80, saw a decline in real GNP of 4.7 per cent!
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Further, the growth rate in key production sectors -
agriculture, mining, manufacturing and electricity
generation - taken together, has not reached five per
cent in a single year, except in the recovery year of
1980-81: 'The growth rate of these sectors was around
3.2 per cent in 1985-86 and it is likely once again to
barely exceed 3 per cent in 1986-87 . . . On the whole,
then, agriculture and industrial production . . . is (sic)
keeping ahead of population growth by the most
modest of margins. By contrast the contribution of
banking and insurance to gross domestic product
expanded by 11.5 per cent in 1985-86 and by 11.3 per
cent and 9.1 per cent in the two preceding years. Even
more impressive has been the performance of public
administration and defence which witnessed growth
rates of 12.5, 13.4 and 12.4 per cent, respectively, in the
same three years' [EPW, editorial, February 20, 1987].
Parts of this argument may be disputed. It is claimed
that the recently revised Index of Industrial
Production shows growth in the manufacturing sector
of 8 per cent in the three years up to 1987. The
Economic Survey 1 985-86 commented: '... the Index
of Industrial Production, with the year 1970 as the
base, suffers from various limitations. Industrial
structure in India has undergone major changes since
1970 . . . (and) . . . the lIP, therefore, tends to
understate the rate of growth of industrial production'
(p.43). It went on to compare the growth rate for the
period 1974-75 to 1982-83 according to the HP with an
estimate based on the Annual Survey of Industries and
found that whereas the lIP gave a figure of4.4 per cent
per annum, the AST showed growth of 8 per cent per
annum. The TIP has subsequently been revised with
1980-81 as the base year and it is on the basis of this
index that the higher rates of growth in manufacturing
are claimed. Under the new measure, industrial
production showed an increase of 8.7 per cent in 1985-
86 whereas the old index would have shown a decline
of half a percentage point. But it is argued that: 'The
coverage of the revised series, in terms of numbers of
industry groups as well as number of items is.. . rather
poor for the new series to be of much use for planners
and policy makers, though the growth rates recorded
by it are rather encouraging' [Basu 1987:446].
It is also pointed out, not only by critics, that 'The
tom-tomming of the spurt in the growth rate of
industry as per the new index only emphasises the
reliance that is being placed on the market demand of
the upper crust of the population' [BM 1987: 440].
And there are signs that the markets for the 'sunrise
industries' which have grown fast - industries such as
consumer electronics, two-wheelers and passenger
cars - are rapidly becoming saturated. The Far
Eastern Economic Review reported that 'Market
analysts see the current spurt of car purchases as no
more than a flash-in-the-pan expression of pent-up
demand. Once it wears off, the market is expected to
require a 30 per cent rate of used-car attrition per year
to support new car sales' [July31, 1986]. In 1987 there
have been reports of capacity outstripping demand for
a number of products - including cement, mopeds
and televisïon sets, and, partly in consequence, both of
expansion in the advertising industry and of increased
company failures [Economist April 4, 1986].
The Budget of 1987, drawn up by the Prime Minister,
who took over the Finance Ministry himself after V. P.
Singh was moved to Defence, was thus announced in a
climate of increasing uncertainty about the govern-
ment's purpose (not just in the sphere of economic
policy), about the real trends within the economy, and
about the political stability of the country - with no
signs of a resolution of the Punjab conflict and
increasing doubts about the Prime Minister's control
over the situation. The Budget statement returned to
claims about the construction of socialism: 'The
political tensions which have surfaced in the past few
months. . . have induced the political masters to revert
with remarkable alacrity to radical rhetoric' [BM
1987:873]. It was otherwise remarkable for leaving
much the largest uncovered deficit there has ever been,
and for proposing a rise of 43 per cent in defence
expenditure alongside an increase in the Plan outlay of
just 12 per cent. In 1985-86 the actual deficit turned
out to be roughly twice the amount budgetted, and in
1986-87 getting on for thrice that estimated. Even the
government's Economic Survey 1986-87 admits that
the rapid increase in non-plan expenditure, especially
that for defence and administration, has kept the
budget on revenue account in deficit throughout the
I980s and that the deficit has increased steadily over
the last five years. The EPW concluded: 'The increases
in the government's tax collections, which the
Economic Survey credits to 'far-reaching reforms in
fiscal policy', have thus made no contribution
whatsoever to financing the Plan. At the same time,
the public sector enterprises, too, have failed to
provide their mite . . . Clearly, then, it has been
possible for the government to finance the Plan only
by large-scale resort to deficit financing' [February 28,
1987:345]. The Prime Minister/Finance Minister was
unwilling to go for a hard budget in the face of a very
stretched budgetary position, and he chose to meet
demands on resources for defence and security at the
expense of development (the greatest increases in
expenditure projected were for defence and the
police), to leave a large deficit uncovered and to
refrain from any major additional effort to raise
resources [see BM 1987:439]. But the Budget was still
not well received. Business hopes for major duty relief
and investment allowances were disappointed and
share prices plunged across the board.
Alongside the mounting budget deficit the govern-
ment's expectations of a significant improvement in
the country's balance of trade position in 1986-87 have
been belied - and the situation would have been even
worse but for the extraneous factor of the sharp fall in
international oil prices [see EF W, June 13, 1987:913].
Export targets are not being met, and the World Bank
warned in 1986 that in these circumstances commercial
borrowings and concomitant debt-service levels will
be prohibitive if the import levels needed to realise
Seventh Plan targets are to be maintained [FarEastern
Economic Review October 2, 1986].
Explanation: What Has Policy Done?
What are we to make of these developments? Why, in
the first place, should a major change in the economic
regime have been pronounced in 1985? Then, why
should it have gone off at half cock? Was there really
an attempt to liberalise the Indian economy in 1985?
Or - viewing developments in the light of Schaffer's
aphorism that 'Policy is what policy does' - what
interests are served by the peculiarly muddled way in
which liberalisation has actually been implemented?
What economic and fiscal policy in India seem to have
done in the 1980s has been to generate growth,
especially in services (where the growth rate has been
more than nine per cent on average), and dominantly
in defence and public administration. All the time
public expenditure has grown. The government's
'Long Term Fiscal Policy' (LTFP) document of
December 1985'. . . drew attention to the fact that the
total expenditure of the central and state governments
together had increased almost 17-fold from 1970-71 to
1983-84 with its share of GDP increasing from 21.1 to
31.1 per cent' [Kurien 1987:641]. This expansion of
public expenditure has been associated in the 1980s
with a decline in the proportion of revenue amongst
the sources of government finance, and accordingly
with greater reliance on borrowing (though mainly
internal) and deficit financing [see Kurien
1987:Table 3]. As Kurien says '. . . there is a need to
search . . . for the rationale of growing public
expenditure per se, treating it as a major policy
decision of the government, rather than as a sign of the
helplessness of the government which is being
confronted by growing demands for funds' [Kurien
1987:641].
Kurien's own answer to the question he poses is that in
spite of its professed identification with the poor, the
government has in its fiscal policy exercised an option
in favour of the relatively small affluent class. The
share of direct taxes in the total tax revenue of the
central government has declined, according to the
LFTP, as has the share of income tax, and the
government has claimed that the economy has reached
its tax ceiling. On the other side, through its public
expenditure and increased reliance on internal
borrowing, the government has made a direct
contribution to the affluent sector. It is of course not
true that all of those who are employed in the public
sector are 'affluent', but some of those who pay direct
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taxes are government employees; and it is known that
a part of the direct and indirect effect of government
expenditure accrues as incomes to those who are
already affluent - like the larger farmers who are in
the best position to benefit from fertiliser subsidies,
export traders and contractors. The members of the
'affluent class' benefit from lending to the government
through the banks. Public expenditure has not been
raised because of increased allocations for poverty
alleviation, when these programmes claim less than
three per cent of Plan expenditure. The deficit is part
of an attempt to stimulate economic activity, but not
of the type where deficit financing is used to put people
to work to produce labour intensive infrastructural
items. Here '. . . the aim has been to stimulate the
production of certain kinds of industrial goods
(consumer durables) for which the demand could
simultaneously be generated by the type of additional
incomes created through increased public expenditure
.
. The essence of the new fiscal strategy is to make the
island of affluence, or the upper crust of the economy,
a largely self-serving segment' [Kurien 1987:645].
Explanation: A Longer Run View of India's
Fiscal Problems
If we examine recent trends in the context of the
development of the Indian polity over the last 40 years
then it is possible to see the move towards economic
liberalisation in 1985 as an outcome of India's
persistent fiscal problems, which are themselves
politically determined. What some would refer to as
'the fiscal crisis of the state' was, at an earlier stage of
its development, instrumental in bringing about the
retreat from the attempt to plan India's economic
development in the mid-1960s (in the period of what
was described at the time as 'the crisis of Indian
planning'). That 'crisis' and the subsequent (relative)
stagnation of the Indian economy can be understood
as the outcome of the compromised nature of class
power and the weakness of the state in relation to 'civil
society'. The continuation and development of the
fiscal problems which were already apparent 20 years
earlier seems to account for the 1985 Budget. The way
out of the fiscal problem was evidently seen as being
through the reduction of the state's role in the
economy: 'The political pressure for liberalisation has
come from the perilous state of the government's
finances . . .' - the pressure emanating from '... the
desire of India's politicians to increase tax revenue so
that they can continue to bestow largesse . . .' [The
Economist January 31, 1987]. For The Economist the
'new policy' should be seen as simply another twist in
the game of winkling out resources which can be doled
out as benefits in a political system depending on
patronage: 'Mr Gandhi has been told repeatedly (by
stalwarts of the Congress Party) that the fortunes of
his party depend on the patronage it can dispense in
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the name of socialism . . . Many in his party see
economic liberalisation as a galling erosion of their
power. But some also realise that the new policy could
increase the tax-take and thus their power to spend
where and on whom they want . . . Mr Gandhi the
politician feels that he must keep doling out the cash.
Three of his main reforms - fewer import controls, a
cut in income tax rates and the introduction of a
value-added tax - are designed to pull in more
revenue rather than reduce the role of government in
the economy'.
Radical Indian economists like C. T. Kurien, cited
earlier, or Sanjay Baru [1985] concur with some of
this. They see budget deficits as a reflection, as much
or more, of the inability of the state to raise resources
as of its inability to control expenditure. Baru wrote of
the 1985 Budget that '. . . to the extent that increased
expenditure has to be incurred, the inability of the
state to raise matching resources to meet even (the
truncated expenditure planned in the Budget)
represents "the fiscal crisis of the state". He too saw
this being used as an argument for the rolling back of
the role of the state in the economy, but suggested that
this approach does not get at the root of the problem,
which has been the inability of the state to raise
revenues. The fiscal trends of the last two years seem to
prove him right.
Let us amplify these arguments. In 1947, and in the
years immediately after Independence, the Congress
government, because of the role of the Congress in the
Freedom Struggle and the prestige of its (at that time)
truly national leadership, was relatively strong in
relation to society. But the regime was also divided
ideologically between those with socialist views,
conservatives sympathetic to the big bourgeoisie and
to the idea of market regulation of the economy, and
Gandhians. Under Nehru's leadership, undisputed
after the death of Patel, the regime embarked on an
ambitious programme of planned economic develop-
ment, but in the context of a formally democratic
political system in which the need to accommodate a
range of different views and pressures was apparent.
In the middle l9SOs, in the Second Five Year Plan, a
programme for autonomous industrialisation was
undertaken, aimed at breaking away from the
international industrial division of labour inherited
from colonialism, and at the expansion of the
economic space of Indian capital [Prabhat Patnaik's
formulation, 1986]. The undeveloped industrial
structure of India was indeed transformed by the
middle 1960s, and high industrial growth rates were
achieved. The programme was carried through in the
face of strong opposition both internally and
externally (and it was watered down as a result), and it
has subsequently been fashionable to criticise this
industry-led, import substituting and 'urban biased'
strategy for development [Mellor 1976; Lipton 1977].
The extent of the achievement must not be discounted
therefore [see, for example, Balsubramanyam
1985:112], nor the economic logic of the hostility of
Western, especially US capital to it, and the favouring
of 'liberalisation' [see Patnaik 1986]. Arguments
about the limitations of the Mahalanobis model on
which the Second Plan was based, should not be
confused with the consequences of the political
context in which it was introduced [Sutcliffe 1971].
The drive for autonomous industrialisation faltered,
however, and the effort to plan economic development
foundered in the mid-1960s. Toye [1981] showed that
the deceleration of industrial growth from that time
was not a general phenomenon but one concentrated
in the capital goods industries and to a lesser extent in
intermediate goods. The abandonment of the policy of
state promoted capital accumulation, which
characterised the Second and Third Five Year Plans,
caused the slow-down in industrialisation. Why did
this shift in policy take place? There is a good degree of
consensus amongst economists that it was most
crucially the result of the inability of the government
to raise resources domestically at the expense of
property incomes, in a context in which the Congress
party had an increased need for legitimacy. By the
middle 1960s the state was unable to sustain increased
development expenditure because of a fiscal crisis,
arising from increased non-developmental expenditure
commitments combined with an inability to raise
more resources domestically, and consequent heavy
dependence on regressive indirect taxation, on deficit
financing, and on foreign aid.
The crisis of the Third Plan in the early 1960s, with
stagnation in agriculture, shortages of power and
essential raw materials, increasing prices, and -
crucially - yawning budgetary deficits, led to
increasing pressures for reductions in plan outlays and
for greater reliance on the private sector. By-election
reverses in 1963 showed how the opposition could
harness discontent and continued the undermining of
Nehru's prestige, withered by the China War of 1962.
A series of ideological and policy battles ensued as
Nehru sought to reaffirm the commitment of Congress
to democratic transformation. But with his death the
change in the means and objectives of public policy
which was being actively pursued by Congress
conservatives such as Morarji Desai even in the later
part of Nehru's lifetime, was soon completed. Shastri
lacked an independent power base and, giving in to
both domestic critics and to criticisms by international
aid-giving agencies'. . . of overly ambitious industrial
plans in the public sector and inefficient methods of
development both in agriculture and in industry that
ignored incentives to private (domestic and foreign)
investment' [Frankel 1978:246], he allowed a
reorientation of the approach to the economy. The
Planning Commission was effectively displaced as a
policy-making body; there was a shift from controls to
incentives as major instruments of development
planning; and an enlarged role for private domestic
and foreign investment was encouraged. Shortly after
Shastri's death, and before Indira Gandhi had fully
taken control of the reins of government, the power of
international capital and the direct influence of the US
government was shown in the 1966 devaluation, which
was strongly opposed within India.
After the middle 1960s, what Shetty describes as
'structural retrogression' took place, shown by the
facts (amongst others) that services have grown faster
than commodity producing sectors; that the growth of
basic and capital goods industries has been slower
than the meagre average growth in industrial output;
and that the production of mass consumption goods
has lagged behind that of elite oriented consumer
goods. All these tendencies have been accentuated in
the 1 980s. At the same time there is evidence ofa great
deal of under-utilised capacity, and there has been no
growth in organised sector employment (latterly,
indeed, the proportion of the labour force engaged in
the organised sector has actually been reduced [EPW,
February 28, 1987:346]).
Shetty argues that structural retrogression is the result
of the decline of planning - referring to the twin
phenomena of the reduction of rigorous industrial
controls (which he shows to have given rise to
distortions in production and investment patterns in
the private sector), and of serious financial mis-
management, which is shown both in the frittering
away of a significant proportion of public-sector
outlays in non-developmental expenditure, and in the
distorted system of resource mobilisation. These result
in large measure from the political pressures of
federalism and the power of 'bullock capitalists'
(the Rudolphs' evocative term) and landlords both to
resist taxation and to mulct public sector resources
through cancellations or reductions of electricity
charges and of debts to formal credit institutions. The
increasing significance of transfers to state govern-
ments for purposes other than development and
capital formation reflects the increasing pressures
exerted by states on the centre, already apparent by the
early 1960s, as Hanson showed [1966]. Transfers to
state governments include allocations for famine relief
assistance, for example, of which the Seventh Finance
Commission'. . . implicitly brought out that the relief
expenditure encouraged by the centre was largely
determined by political patronage extended to a few
states' [Shetty 1978:223]. Financial relations between
the centre and the states in the early 1980s were in a
chaotic state. Why, for example, should Maharashtra,
with a population of 55 mn, have been awarded a plan
outlay of Rs 15,000 mn while Uttar Pradesh, with twice
that population, received only Rs12,500 mn, or West
Bengal with the same population received only
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Rs5,000 mn? Shetty builds up a picture of enormous
wastage of financial resources, whilst showing at the
same time that the system of resource mobilisation has
been distorted because of(i) the government's refusal
to touch the richer segments of the farm community;
(ii) reductions in the marginal tax rates on personal
incomes and wealth in the non-farm sector; (iii) its
continued reliance on indirect taxes which are
regressive; and (iv) its resort to a disproportionate
amount of deficit spending [and see Shetty's summary;
1978:228].
Shetty's analysis of public policy and its impact shows
that the same basic constraints that were crucial in the
period up to the mid-I 960s - the inability of the state
to raise sufficient resources domestically through
direct taxation of property incomes; the failure of
agrarian reforms; and the serious market constraints
which have been exacerbated still further by regressive
taxation - have persisted in the period since then, and
have even been intensified by the relaxation of
attempts to control and to plan the economy. His
explanation for 'structural retrogression' is that it has
come about because of 'the decline of planning', but
this only leads us to ask the further question of why
planning should have declined. The crisis of planning
came about in the 1960s because of resource
constraints and failures in the implementation of plans
up to that time which resulted, amongst other factors,
from the power of the rural rich to resist taxation and
to turn measures of agrarian reform to their own
advantage, and from the power, especially, of big
business similarly to turn industrial controls and to
resist taxation. Fundamentally the failure of planning
came about because of the dependence of the Congress
government, for its control of the state, upon the
classes which would have had to sacrifice most for
planning to succeed. The failures of planning became
self-reinforcing because, as plan targets were not
fulfilled, discontents increased and were given
political expression in the rise of opposition.
Following from these observations, state power may
be seen as lying in an uneasy alliance between the big
bourgeoisie and the dominant rural class, and it is this
compromise of power which finally underlies the
structural constraints that have affected Indian
economic development, expressed in fiscal weakness.
Theories about India's Political Economy and
The Explanation of Recent Developments
The principal alternative to the view of Indian political
economy presented thus far is found in the work
described as 'the new political economy', within the
neo-classical paradigm, which'. . . has been based on
empirical studies of government intervention in trade
and industry and the varied effects that such policy
actions in India have had' [Toye 1988]. Empirical
studies by Bhagwati and his collaborators sought to
36
show how exchange controls leading to the over-
valuation of the rupee, and bureaucratically dis-
cretionary methods of restricting imports and
sanctioning investments in industry, led to economic
distortions and inefficiency. The'. . . origin of the new
political economy was in the implications that were
drawn out of their economic analysis of the
consequences of bureaucratic controls' [Toye 1988].
Essentially what is argued is that India is a 'rent-
seeking society' - or more accurately that India is a
society with a rent-seeking government: '. . . the
misguided adoption of certain economic policies,
especially import quotas, itself creates a society with
certain economic irrationalities such as permanently
under-utilised industrial capacity, a corrupt admini-
stration and a political structure dominated by
interests fed financially by windfall gains (from
bureaucratic rents, based on the system of controls).
This latter feature is important because, almost by
definition, it rules out the possibility of achieving the
reforms which the neo-classicials are seeking, at any
rate in a democratic polity like India' [Toye 1988].
Recognising the insights in this argument, whilst also
being aware of its limitations in terms of the
specification of political dynamics, Bardhan [1984]
has brought this explanation together with the
conception of the Indian state as 'a duopolistic
arrangement between the rural oligarchy and the
industrial bourgeoisie' [Mitra] which informs the
account of India's political economy offered above.
Bardhan's argument is that the trends of Indian
economic development can be explained as the
outcome of conflicts and compromises between three
dominant propertied classes: the industrial capitalist
class, the class of 'rich farmers' and a class of public
sector professionals. An important expression of
conflict between the urban industrial and professional
classes, and the dominant rurals, is observed in the
struggles over farm prices and inputs costs which have
become a recurrent feature of Indian politics [most
recently in Gujarat and UP; see EPWMarch 28, 1987].
There is a great deal of inconclusive debate over the
'real' trends in the terms of trade between agriculture
and non-agriculture. There certainly is evidence for
the recent past (late 1970s and early 1980s) of a 'costs
squeeze' in agriculture, but at the same time work like
that of Shetty's, discussed earlier, shows the extent of
the power of rural people to extract resources from
state governments - and not only 'dominant rurals',
in view of the sizeable proportions of all development
expenditure in Maharasthra, for example, being
absorbed by the Employment Guarantee Scheme, or
in Tamil Nadu by the Chief Minister's Nutritious
Noon Meal Scheme. The state has been unable to tax
the rural sector directly to any significant extent,
though poor rural people have borne the brunt of the
cost of indirect taxation - such as the price increases
resulting from the customs and tariff impositions on
cement and on petroleum products in the 1985 Budget.
There is a complex net of transfers and payments
between 'sectors' which no-one has adequately sorted
out quantitatively. But what does seem to stand out is
that compromises are being made all the time between
the interests of different groups of rural people and
those of the industrial bourgeoisie and the working
class; and that while the government at the centre may
favour industrial interests, state governments have
used their resources to maintain political support,
which has often meant making concessions to rural
interests at the expense of those of industrialists (such,
perhaps, as is implied in Devi Lal's pledge to cancel
outstanding farm loans in the recent state elections in
Haryana). At the same time, for Bardhan, public
sector professionals constitute another distinct set of
proprietorial interests - in conflict over bureaucratic
rent creation and distribution with industrial
capitalists and to a lesser extent with farmers. So he
presents:
a picture of the Indian government as managing
class conflicts by expanding subsidies on food,
agricultural inputs, and public-sector produced
inputs with little regard for their impact on raising
productivity. This expansion is seen as driven by
the rising stakes in electoral competitions and the
rise of gangs led by a large number of MLAs and
MPs, political middlemen who over the years have
specialised in the profession of brokerage services
[Toye's summary; 1988].
The actual trends in public finance in India have seen
the expansion of public expenditure associated with
increased reliance on deficit financing, on indirect
taxation, and latterly on commercial borrowing, and
they have involved a divorce between development
goals and actual resource allocation, increased
decentralisation of public expenditure decisions and a
preference for consumption over investment spending
[see Shetty]. These trends are the outcome of the
government's quest for legitimacy and the com-
promises that have been made between conflicting
interests of the three dominant propertied classes. The
Indian political system (the Congress 'dominant party
system') worked effectively to accommodate different
interests up till the 1970s. The event of the Emergency
between 1975 and 1977 shows the breakdown of that
system [see Blair 1980], as a result both of the kind of
fiscal crisis depicted by Shetty, and the inability of the
system to supply sufficient resources to meet divergent
demands, and of Indira Gandhi's attempt to centralise
power by destroying the local organisation of the
Congress. The period ofJanata rule saw first, relief of
the pressures of managing legitimacy, and then their
renewal in a context in which 'bullock capitalists' were
more strongly represented at the centre than before.
They were relieved again by Indira Gandhi's
triumphant return to power in January 1980, and yet
again by the support generated by Rajiv after her
assassination in 1984. But the dominant trends of the
1980s have seen the government at the centre
increasingly embattled in the face of violent separatist
and regionalist movements, especially in Punjab,
Assam and elsewhere in the North East, and in
Kashmir, and by its 'isolation' as never before, as the
non-Hindi speaking states have come under the
control of non-Congress governments. There is, in
Bardhan's terms, a crisis of political legitimation
which has called forth increased expenditure on
defence and internal security, so exacerbating yet
further India's basic fiscal problems.
In the light of this view of India's political economy
the economic liberalisation proposed in the 1985
Budget can be seen as an attempt by the Central
government, in a phase in which it was relatively
strong in relation to society, given the strength of
electoral support for Rajiv, 'to reshape the relation of
the Indian state to economic interests' and 'to reassert
the autonomy of high politics' [Rubin]. That Budget
really did reflect '. . . an attempt to change at least
some of the conditions that the theoretical debate has
pointed to as causes of slow industrialisation' [Rubin
1985:948] - inefficiencies resulting from the industrial
policy regime, and the problems of inadequate
demand. Prabhat Patnaik, from the left, concurs to an
extent with this view when he argues that the
declaration of a 'new economic policy' was more the
result of a strong build-up of internal pressures than a
response to external forces - these pressures being the
outcome of the crisis that had developed in the earlier
regime '. . . consisting in the fact that the ability of the
regime to generate substantial industrial expansion
got progressively impaired overtime' [1986:1,015].
Patnaik's argument is that industrial stagnation has
substantially been the result of the stagnation in public
investment [cf. bye 1981, cited above], and that this
in turn, has been the result of the 'fiscal crisis' we
depicted earlier. Internal pressures for liberalisation
have come, he thinks, from big business because it has
found growth of investment opportunities constricted
relative to the growth of its command over capital. It
has to do deals with metropolitan capital in order to
enter the international arena in any significant way.
But metropolitan capital insists on the opening up of
domestic markets. It is for this reason, as well as
because of interests in expanding into hitherto closed
domestic channels for investment that big business has
given cautious and qualified support to the
liberalisation urged by the World Bank from the early
1980s.
But though there were, and remain, powerful groups
with interests in effective liberalisation, it has become
clear that others are threatened by the possible
removal of the system of controls from which they
have benefited by being able to manipulate it, by direct
competition from imports, or by indirect competition
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mediated by shifts in demand away from old goods to
new ones. And events have shown that the regime is
unable to resist the political pressures which have
created and perpetuated India's basic fiscal problems.
So there has been a fudge, and the underlying
tendencies, towards increasing public expenditure,
increasing imbalance in taxation, and increasing
resort to commercial borrowing, have been intensified
in practice. The move to 'liberalise' the economy was
perhaps even half-hearted in intention. Rubin argued
of the Indira period that'. . . in the area of industrial
policy the autonomy of the state in Bardhan's sense
(the ability of the class of state officials to define and
pursue a distinct set of interests), together with the
power of other dominant classes, limits the autonomy
of the state in the Marxist sense. Private deals
negotiated among politicians, bureaucrats and
industrialists . . . render difficult the pursuit of policy
in the interests of "capital as a whole" or, for India, the
dominant coalition as a whole. . .' [1985:947]. In this
context the attempt under Rajiv 'to reassert the
autonomy of high politics' was very shortlived, as
Rubin surmised it might be. Both the 'new economic
policy' promised in 1985 and the rapid retreat from it
in practice, should be seen as outcomes of the
compromised nature of class power and the weakness
of the state as an organisation. India does not present
an instance of 'the developmental state in retreat' in
the 1980s. It remains, as it has been, a weak but plastic
state, though also one with a sufficiently developed
industrial base of its own in capital and intermediate
goods, as to be able to resist external pressures in
favour of 'liberalisation'. It seems that here a real
attempt to liberalise the economy probably would
require the establishment of a much more authoritarian
regime, able to ride over the powerful interests
represented in the dominant coalition.
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